THE New Republic

Adam Smith Updated

Editorial

Pages 3-4

Formosa on a Back Burner

Now Is the Time to Change Our China Policy

By CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL

Dying Days for Dictators

Latin America Unites for Insurrection

By RUTH NORDHAUS PEARSON

Deliberate, Yes—Speed, No . . . . *Helen Fuller*

Safari Among the Wariri . . . *Reed Whittemore*

Man's Image at Urbana . . . . . *Frank Getlein*

MARCH 16, 1959

25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire

Eisenhower Takes Command

CAN THE ESSENCE of the Berlin crisis be stated simply? In half a century Russia has twice been savagely invaded by a militarist Germany. Moscow has a phobia about Germany. The West proposes to give West Germany nuclear arms in 1960. That frightens Moscow. Simultaneously Moscow believes divided Berlin is a war-breeder: consequently it seeks Berlin unity under terms to its advantage. It has delivered a mid-May ultimatum to us (which Macmillan's visit to Moscow has got extended). Meanwhile Khrushchev tries to confuse the West by blowing first cold, then hot.

In this crisis Congressional leaders have gone to the White House, slapped their breasts at the portico and said, "We are united." United for what? We don't know. Eisenhower has said, "We will not yield an inch," referring to the abandonment of West Berlin and our legal rights. But that is a short-term issue. The real issue is whether we shall continue to insist that if there is any settlement of the big German problem it shall be only on our terms. On that, hitherto, Dulles has been inflexible (though he thawed a bit just before hospitalization.)

There the situation stands as Macmillan begins his momentous journeys. But a second, American, development has occurred. Eisenhower, taking larger command of policy, has pushed his budget-balancing fixation to a new extreme. According to a fascinating story by *New York Times*man James Reston, the President assured visiting Congressmen that the Nation's defenses are in apple-pie order but the federal finances give him grave concern. This produced disunity with his Congressional visitors. Not disunity over America's will to resist an ultimatum (everybody is united over that)—but over the President's sense of values. Eisenhower was represented as disturbed lest the crisis unbalance his budget. Time and again he reportedly came back to the thesis that the Soviet's strategy is to "spend us into bankruptcy." Pointing to risk of atomic war, Democrats urged him to drop pending Administration cuts in defense manpower and to start additional missile programs. (Dean Acheson recommends this for its psychological effect.)

No, said the eternally optimistic President. He would not, he said, hesitate to unbalance the budget were there need. But armed forces are now nicely balanced (as well as the budget). And he did not wish to stir up the nation unduly. . . .

No. 1 Economic Need

THE PRESIDENT'S January economic and budget messages were postulated on two assumptions: that inflation is the nation's major domestic danger and that the 1957 recession is over. Now comes the report of the 16-man Joint Economic Committee of Congress (reviewing the President's position as required by law). The consensus of expert testimony, it declares, is that instead of inflation, prices have been, and will remain, substantially level in 1959. In spite of the "first enthusiastic claims that the recession is over," unemployment continues high. And the Committee says that the Nation's Number One economic need is expansion, a need that is presently hampered by a rigid tight-money policy. Six Republicans dissent.

Incidentally, we were glad to get a speech from Michigan's able Governor Mennen Williams last week pointing out why his state is in financial difficulties. Conservative columnists have whooped with glee over the supposed come-uppance of the labor-welfare state. What they ignore is that Williams has steadily faced a Republican legislature. He has urged more taxes since 1949; the GOP wouldn't vote them. Now the tail-fin automobile recession has brought a crisis of declining revenue. Just like Republican Governor Nelson Rockefeller in New York, Williams is trying to get tax rationalization. After playing politics with stability a while longer, the GOP legislature will probably act.

Irrefutable Insanity

WE ARE HAUNTED by a simple plan suggested by reader Nathan Horwitt, Lenox, Mass., to bring global stability at one bounce. We threw it away, then resurrected it. It has the irrefutable logic of insanity. Under the Horwitt Plan, America and Russia would each agree to let the other establish atomic bases 100 miles away from each major population center. Then everybody would sit back and relax. No inspection needed—it would be peace or extermination. With this categorical 2-way deterrent, nobody need fear war any more; the cost of arms could go into education. You say it wouldn't work? Well, we toss on our bed at night trying to figure out why.

It's a red letter week that brings a new annual report of the House Un-American Activities Committee. This one is 104 pages and explains why; although the Communist Party is getting smaller and smaller, its potential danger is getting bigger and bigger. (The Committee's nightmare is that the Party will disappear altogether.) The Committee wrings its hands over the "apathy, indifference and softened attitude . . . of the American public." Fortunately there is good old J. Edgar Hoover, who is quoted verbatim as saying that such apathy "is the sure way to national suicide. . . . Those who try to minimize its danger are either uninformed or have a deadly ax to grind." Miss Cathcart, our ax please.

Notes

IT SEEMS INCREDIBLE to us that soapmaker Neil McElroy can abandon his defense post at a time of crisis like this; maybe that's the difference between a businessman and an humble politician. If Dulles and McElroy leave, only one of Eisenhower's original "eight millionaires and a plumber" will remain—the durable Ezra Taft Benson. . . . Despite Eisenhower's 1952 hopes that the "best men" would "gladly report" to a businessman's government, businessmen have proved shy. . . . Latest Gallup Polls continue the idea that Nixon is the easiest man for the Democrats to beat.

T.R.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

VOL. 140, NO. 11, ISSUE 2313
MARCH 16, 1959

THE WEEK 3

Adam Smith Updated; Housing in the House; Johnson on Foreign Aid; As the Allies Confer; Butler in Charge; Who Follows Chiang?

ARTICLES 7

Formosa on a Back Burner
by Charles Burton Marshall
Deliberate, Yes—Speed, No
by Helen Fuller
Dying Days for Dictators
by Ruth Nordhaus Pearson

BOOKS 17

MOVIES 20

ART 21

MUSIC 22

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. RUSKIN, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Alexander M. Bickel, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann, James E. King, Jr., Donald Malcolm, Helen Hill Miller, Michael Straight

Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 - 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 25¢. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses. Copyright 1959, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Correspondence

► *Kennedy and Catholics*

SIRS:

TRB (*NR*, March 9) seems to miss the point of the preponderant Catholic press criticism of Senator Kennedy's "Church and State" position as quoted in *Look* magazine. This criticism, he says, "does offer a disturbing hint that

(Continued on page 24)

Adam Smith Updated

CERTAINLY the President's muddled exhortations and his advisers' platitudes on the "sound dollar" do no credit to the honorable tradition of conservative economic thought. There must be more to Adam Smith, *circa* 1959, than obsessive longing for balanced budgets. In a February editorial, *Fortune* presents a much more intelligent statement—one susceptible to close liberal evaluation. Its editorial opens with an attack on J. K. Galbraith for missing the " . . . basic libertarian point that while the market in general enlarges the field of human choice, government action, however necessary, is by definition coercive." *Fortune* temperately does not propose to eject government from society's affairs. But,

> . . . granted that government today will play an important part in our lives through monetary and fiscal policy, as well as because of the overriding needs of defense, still there are many places where the functions of government could be cut down, given some hard thought and half the ingenuity that modern liberals now give to enlarging the prerogatives of the state.

Just where can the reductions be made? "The privately-financed toll road is a better bet than the Washington financed super-highway. Private power can do all that is promised by new TVA's." It is a harmful fiction that " . . . as a society grows richer it generates or can generate its own built-in social security."

Does government action necessarily coerce? Do private markets necessarily liberate? In some of its necessary functions, every government employs compulsion. Tax payments partially, and compulsory military service nearly completely, limit the freedom of the law abiding, and police and prisons impede the lawless. But this is scarcely the end of the matter. A case-by-case consideration of what modern democratic governments do tells a more complex story. A category in themselves are the varied measures designed to shelter the unfortunate. Widows, dependent children, handicapped veterans and the aged, none of them participants in the economic fray, depend for decent existence on government support. Of course, no retired citizen, widow, or veteran is compelled to accept his government's bounty. But would he or she be freer without it?

A second category of government activity enlarges economic choice by diminishing economic insecurity: unemployment compensation does not coddle its recipients; it enables them to move more readily from one job to another and to risk more easily geographic and occupational change. As the case of the migratory farm laborer suggests, workers who must depend unaided upon their own resources enjoy precious little freedom. It is unnecessary to endorse the wisdom of our present agricultural policies to place the parity price program in the same general class. The point of these policies is the opportunity they offer farmers to choose less desperately between farming and other occupations. To stigmatize these programs as coercive is to ignore the opportunities to contract out of them and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

essentially coercive face which unprotected competition presented to American agriculture before 1933 and the first AAA.

Put briefly, real freedom of choice implies the existence of genuine alternatives. Properly conceived, the range of government policies which promote economic stability (a third category to be considered), simultaneously encourage individual security and individual choice. The fiscal and monetary policies to which *Fortune* is little more than resigned imperatively demand strengthening and resolute use. Tax cuts and public works could and should have limited the recession which still harasses an economy that has 4.8 million unemployed.

An increasingly important fourth type of government intervention attempts to fill the gaps left by private enterprise. For does not experience demonstrate that private enterprisers have little interest in building the schools, hospitals, inexpensive housing, parks and concert halls which go far in defining the quality of a society? Yet such minimum urban amenities are precisely those which promote intelligent choice. Education widens individual comprehension of alternatives and encourages accurate discrimination among them. In what sense, then, can it be said that state action which enlightens its citizens, prepares them for wide choice, and infrequently competes with private authority, is coercive?

These categories and examples far from exhaust the topic of government's proper role and impact. But they are enough to imply that only when modern democratic government acts uncreatively is its primary role coercive. Much more frequently, it measurably serves the object of *Fortune's* desire, the widening of individual choice.

Fortune's claim that "the market in general enhances the field of human choice" exposes a characteristic conservative nostalgia. No doubt, in the 19th Century there was much truth in the view that competition was for the most part "free." Enterprise was relatively small and opportunities comparatively unlimited. Although the success stories fail to compute the human costs of the failures, a hundred years ago the bold, the imaginative, and the ruthless could build their lives in expectations of riches. Many a man's strong hands molded his own fate. Or so, in retrospect, it now appears. Fortunately, talent and industry still enjoy rewards in our society. But the conditions under which these rewards may be grasped are drastically different. In particular, the character of the private market has changed so radically that in many parts of the economy private governments, of varying benevolence, control the lives of employees, subordinates, suppliers and customers. This is one of the effects of the existence of great industrial empires like General Motors, General Electric, du Pont, US Steel and their peers. If the markets which they control widen the field of human choice, it is equally accurate to maintain that employment in a government bureaucracy does as much. Increasingly, the structure of business enterprise puts the small business unit under the domination of the large one. In government work, small sub-contractors exist at the discretion of large prime contractors. In ordinary production, small suppliers survive so long as their large customers decide against continued integration of their productive facilities. Real choice thus becomes largely a prerogative of large enterprise. Insofar as the tendency has been checked and the small man permitted to thrive in the interstices of national markets, it is because of "coercive" government which, at its most alert, prevents the big from growing bigger by merging with their own kind, discriminating in each other's favor, and eliminating the small. In the reality of the private markets which surround us, it is very hard indeed to see much substance in the vision of freedom which *Fortune* conjures up.

Only at their peril will liberals ignore the potential dangers of government as coercive agent. But liberals separate themselves from conservatives by their perception that in an economy in which giant corporations jostle each other only government can succor the trampled, create a breathing space for the economic pygmies, insure a decent supply of basic cultural amenities, keep the economy stable, and moderate the exercise of private coercion.

Housing in the House

A LARGE SHARE of the credit for the housing bill that has been approved by the House Banking Committee is due Subcommittee Chairman Albert Rains (D, Ala.). But whether his bill comes out wholly intact or is amputated will be decided first in the Rules Committee whose chairman, Rep. Howard Smith (D, Va.), loves to cut. Speaker Rayburn has blessed the measure and earlier this session he assured rebellious Democrats that no reform of the Rules Committee was necessary: he would see that key measures were not pigeon-holed.

The Rains bill authorizes construction of 35,000 new public-housing units a year until completion of the remaining authorization under the 1949 Taft-Ellender-Wagner bill. Close to 200,000 units would be built. (The Senate-adopted bill would allow only 45,000 units.) The House measure would make available to cities $500 million a year over three years for urban renewal, as against the Senate's figure of $350 million a year for six years. However, a technical amendment in the Senate bill would permit the President to use up to $500 million annually for four years if applications from cities warrant it. On balance, the Rains program goes further in meeting the nation's housing needs than does the Senate's—though it does not go nearly as far as the Rockefeller Report recommended. If it gets by Representative Smith and the full House membership (and the chances are better than even it will) it must survive the House-Senate Conference Committee.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Johnson on Foreign Aid

FOR ONE so partial to back-room confidences and so reticent about saying anything controversial in public, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson has been surprisingly above-board in admitting his intention to play politics with foreign economic policy. The Administration's budget requests in foreign economic aid (notably a $700 million, one-year appropriation for the Development Loan Fund) are modest to the point of danger in the light of world needs. Yet Johnson has made a point of warning in recent weeks that he considers even these amounts quite expendable. On February 9 he threatened "reductions in substantial amounts" in the aid requests; and on February 16 it was Johnson who found it "passing strange" that the Administration should ask for increased foreign aid spending, while Everett McKinley Dirksen was left to plead that aid not be made a political "scapegoat." When Dirksen taunted Johnson to endorse or repudiate Senator Smathers' call for "cutting the water and fat from foreign aid spending," Johnson's sarcastic response was that "fairness compels me to say he has never seen fit to go as far as the Administration would go in spreading this money throughout the world."

Senator Johnson, say his defenders, is aware that our national security is not, in 1959, solely or even primarily a military matter. In warning of possible cuts in the aid program, it is said, he is simply reacting in kind to the President's "spenders" attack; in the show-down, he will see that adequate aid appropriations are provided. But aid supporters in Congress are increasingly worried that Johnson means exactly what he says: that for "sound" partisan reasons he gives domestic programs priority over foreign aid and sees aid cuts as the way to keep the party's position clear on the "spending" issue.

Whatever Johnson's motives and ultimate designs, his tactics are of serious concern in a year when many of the less-developed countries are quite literally setting their course for the next decade. What is chiefly at stake in Congress is the capacity of the Loan Fund to assist the less-developed countries while their governments are still looking West for assistance. The President, in failing to ask for permanent status or the billion-dollar minimum appropriation for the Fund advocated by his own Under-Secretary of State, C. Douglas Dillon, was inviting responsible and well-informed members of Congress to initiate action of their own. And there now is a bipartisan move to introduce legislation later this month to grant the Loan Fund authority to borrow up to $1.5 billion per year for a five-year period. But both Senator Johnson and Majority Leader John McCormack in the House are so far giving the chill to this effort.

At the very least the attempt to rally support for the Loan Fund legislation will reduce the chances that the token $700 million asked by the Administration will be pared still further. Unlike the equally desirable but somewhat more controversial aid-to-India resolution introduced by Senators Kennedy and Cooper, here is a measure addressed impartially to all of the less-developed countries, implying nothing more controversial than a willingness to compete with the Soviet economic offensive.

As the Allies Confer

WITHIN a week, the British Prime Minister and the President will be discussing in Washington the most fateful challenge either has faced since taking office. How should the US, the UK and France—in consort with their West German partner—respond to Khrushchev? American public opinion supports the President's insistence that the right of access to Berlin be preserved. But to defend that right is to risk war, and not necessarily a limited war. Is this country—or its European friends—now prepared to take that risk, either militarily or psychologically?

We cannot entirely share TRB's view in *Washington Wire* of this week that the Kremlin is moving in on Berlin because "divided Berlin is a war-breeder." As a politically free and economically flourishing oasis, it is indeed a breeder of envy and discontent in Eastern Europe. And so it should be. As we read the statements of Mr. Khrushchev, what the Russians want is: keep Germany divided; consolidate their puppet party in East Germany; squeeze the US, the UK and France out of Berlin; maintain the illusion that the Western Powers are responsible for continued division; build up for the next push westward on the basis of a well-organized East German satellite and the expectation that West Germans (in particular the Social Democratic opposition) can be persuaded that the West has failed to "do enough" to secure reunification. It is a daring, ambitious program. But whether it is accomplished depends in large measure on the character and spirit of the West's counter-diplomacy.

We need not allow the Russians to retain their tactical initiative. Moscow should be pressed, day in and day out, to negotiate a peace treaty assuring reunification—possibly in phased stages—under a government freely chosen by all Germans. If and when such a government is established with Berlin as its capital, all forces of the wartime occupying powers should be withdrawn. The West cannot in safety, however, accept the Soviet plan for confederation of the two Germanies, for that would bring into being an explosive situation—a "Korea in Europe" with the West trying to avert the explosion and thus making one concession after another.

It is said that the Russians do not understand what is meant by "free elections." They understand perfectly. And because they do understand the consequences to the Communist movement, they feel justified in demanding

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The "Threat to Berlin" How Might the Squeeze Come?

IF IT IS THE SOVIET INTENT simply to change the faces and uniforms of guards who stand at checkpoints and examine travel documents along the highways, canals and railways leading to Berlin, there would be little to worry about. The Western governments could "deal" with East Germans in that event. But is that all Mr. Khrushchev contemplates? The moves which prefaced Stalin's attempt in 1948 to blockade Berlin totally suggest what may come. Once the German Democratic Republic has become "complete master of the communications between Berlin and the German Federal Republic" (as Khrushchev put it in the note of March 2 to Britain, France and the US), we may anticipate the attempt to impose additional controls on those communications. It will, of course, not be difficult for the GDR authorities to fabricate ostensibly "reasonable" explanations for these controls, which may be aimed either at military or civilian traffic, or at both.

★ ★ ★

WHEN THE WEST REJECTS the new controls, as sooner or later it must if Berlin is not to be abandoned, the East German officials may "discover" that an *autoban* bridge is "unsafe" for Allied traffic carrying supplies to Berlin garrisons: trucks are held up. Then, "unfortunately," the canal system becomes temporarily unusable because of a "breakdown" of a critical canal lock: barge traffic is delayed. Then, safety regulations compel the revision of train schedules. Later, perhaps, Communist jamming of ground-control systems or the obstruction of air corridors to Berlin in some other fashion make air travel inadvisable—for a time. The variations are numerous, but the climax is predictable. If impediments are interposed between the West and Berlin, the moment will arrive when the Western powers must either attempt to enforce their right (reaffirmed in the Paris agreements signed by the Russians in 1949) to keep open lines of communication, or they must cut Berlin adrift.

★ ★ ★

THE PRESIDENT REPEATS that we will stand "firm." That is essential. But he has not specified what firmness may require of us. Moreover, when he was asked to comment on the suggestion made by Dean Acheson and others that the West should evidence its firmness by some measures of partial mobilization, he resorted to the old debating trick of reducing the argument to a *reductio ad absurdum* and belabored the idea—suggested by no one—that the US should go into total mobilization.

a very large price in return for granting such elections. The *maximum* price the West could afford to pay—and nations do not offer maximum concessions as a point of departure for negotiations—is the *military* neutralization of a united Germany, accompanied by the nuclear disarmament of a wide area across central Europe.

Butler in Charge

IN AN UNUSUAL reversal of form, the beleaguered Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Paul R. Butler, object of ouster efforts ever since he took office, is a recent three-time winner of substantial stakes. Acceptance of a Butler-appointed committee's recommendation of Los Angeles as the site for the 1960 Democratic Convention was voted over the strenuous objection of the old-line leaders of New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois and Congressional chiefs Rayburn and Johnson. Last weekend the "new blood" in the state party organizations of the Midwest took control of the 14-state Midwest Democratic Conference away from the "old guard"—with Butler's blessing and quiet assistance. (This creates a potential new bloc, with 458 votes, in the 1960 convention. The Milwaukee meeting which produced the *coup* was dominated by backers of Hubert Humphrey and Mennen Williams, working together.)

Not yet noted generally is an additional, more important Butler victory: in the closing minutes of its recent meeting the National Committee voted their chairman full authority over arrangements for the 1960 convention. He will name the men who will select the presiding officers, the platform committee, the keynote speaker and decide other such determining details.

Who Follows Chiang?

EIGHT MILLION Formosans are ruled by a Kuomintang oligarchy representing two million mainlanders. Chiang is 73 years old, and whether Formosa can in the next decade or two be kept out of Peking's hands depends on whether a stable alternative to the Kuomintang political monopoly arises in time. In these pages on November 24, 1958, a young Formosan scholar prophesied that "since there is no legitimate channel for the expression of political dissent . . . violent internal convulsion appears inevitable. The question is when and how it will erupt." That view was subsequently challenged by the Minister Plenipotentiary of the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

Now, in dispatches dated February 28 and March 3, *The New York Times* Hong Kong correspondent, Greg MacGregor, reports on clandestine meetings with Formosan business and professional men:

> A group of prominent Taiwanese met by pre-arrangement at a small, inconspicuous teahouse. Singly and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in pairs they arrived through winding alleys and back lanes. Evidently concerned with being spied upon, one latecomer said his remarks in a hotel room recently had been recorded by a police microphone and he expected trouble.

The "trouble" is a hallmark of police states: formation of any Formosan opposition to the Kuomintang is "beaten down in every way possible"; the courts are politically controlled; intimidation and "subtle threats" make elections a farce; businessmen who decline to recruit new Kuomintang members "find supplies hard to get, inspections frequent and a number of other growing problems that vanish when agreement is given"; above all, native Formosans have no claim on key government posts. According to one leader quoted by MacGregor, no native Formosan has ever been a Cabinet Minister, a provincial governor, a high-ranking military officer or a security officer; Formosans hold only one of 22 police bureau directorships and six of 116 subdirectors' posts. None of the 48 deputy sub-directors is a Formosan.

What do these Formosans say they want? Not, apparently, the overthrow of Chiang; rather, an evolution of the existing regime into something more representative. They wish to avoid any explicit definition of autonomy for Formosa, preferring to remain nominally "Chinese," thus avoiding any direct challenge to the claim of both Peking and the Kuomintang that Formosa is historically part of China. This artful ambiguity can be presented, and so the Formosans presented it to Mr. MacGregor, as a means of preserving a Chinese political identity against the day when Peking might fall. But the Formosans may also be hedging against the day when Chiang is no longer in charge and a Formosan political group might be able to strike its own bargain with the mainland.

What is politically opportune for the Formosans is not inconsistent with US interest: Washington can make clear in many informal and extra-legal ways that it recognizes the sovereignty of the Taipeh regime as extending solely to Formosa and the Pescadores. Thus the distinction which Charles Burton Marshall makes in this issue between diplomatic relations with Peking and the defense of Formosa is a tenable one. But however our government's commitment to Formosa is defined, it will not stand the test of time in the absence of political reforms which give the people we are pledged to defend a personal stake in a non-Communist future.

Formosa on a Back Burner

Now Is the Time To Change Our China Policy

by CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL

THE Secretary of State has made it clear that our government's position is not the absurd one of contending that no such entity as Communist China exists. It does. We acknowledge it does. But our relationship with it does not have that fullness and formality which obtains in international practice when governments enter into normal communication. We do carry on a negotiating relationship of sorts, but through channels that meet at a point removed from the capitals of both places and on very narrow issues of difference. We also persistently oppose the idea of permitting the Communist regime, in power as it is on the mainland, to take up the franchises of the Chinese at the United Nations.

The foundation of these attitudes is that the Communist Chinese regime is an aggressive one, defiant toward the obligations to keep the peace. Washington insists on a sign of good faith—some symbol of contrition, as it were, as a condition to a reconsideration of our attitude. We make the status of Formosa the touchstone of this. We seem to wish to require of the Communist regime some act of renunciation of its claims as successor to the National Republic of China, which, as we know, received the Japanese surrender on Formosa and then went through the formalities of reincorporating the island into the Republic as a province.

There are several observations about this broad situation one may make. First, it is probably vain to expect a regime to go through the motions publicly of qualify-

---

CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL *is a former member of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department (1950-53) and author of* The Limits of Foreign Policy. *His article is drawn from testimony before the Senate Disarmament Subcommittee on February 23.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing itself for recognition, this apart from the elements of intransigence and obduracy characteristic of Communists. I recall, for example, the problem of relationships with Mexico some 35 years ago, heading up in the so-called Bucareli conferences to which we sent two American commissioners to negotiate with the Mexican Government. We attached conditions to recognition. The Mexicans were understandably obdurate. Their position was: recognize first, and then we can negotiate, rather than bowing to conditions as a price for recognition. I suppose any government would incline to that view unless in dire need of receiving recognition.

Second, the withholding of these things from China is not demonstrably effective in hurting the Chinese Communists. They have made quite a thing out of doing very well without US recognition. At present they are carrying on a sort of pro-forma bombardment of the offshore islands in a continuing display of snapping their fingers at the conditions we invoke.

Third, it was probably a mistake in the first instance to pit a matter of prestige and high principle on the issues of these relationships with the Peking regime. I think it wiser to leave such considerations out of account. Yet I recognize the fact of our having done so and all the consequences that flow from it. When one says that prestige and principle are involved, the inevitable effect is to involve them.

Fourth, I do not see how our government can possibly yield on the broad essentials of the position we have assumed regarding the protection of Formosa. There is a deep principle involved, and it would be a faithless act, destructive to our moral position, our prestige and our interests to give in on it. It is a principle akin to the one we faced in regard to forced repatriation of prisoners in the Korean War. Our power was interposed. The lives of actual, tangible persons in great numbers were dependent on our standing by them. In decency and self-respect we could not withdraw our power as a shield to those who had come to rely upon us, and to whom we had extended the shelter of our pledges, and force them into the grip of a regime that would work its punishment on them for their having relied on us.

Fifth, it would be better from the standpoint of our interests to have others associated with us in giving pledges to the security of the Formosa position. Our rights there, as I understand it, derive from our status as a victor power in World War II over a piece of territory, Formosa, yielded up by the Japanese and not yet disposed of by any treaty arrangement. Others have the same basis in juridic right as we have, but only the United States is contractually involved in protecting the position.

Now the impression of stiffness toward the Communist Chinese on our part has something to do with this. We have perhaps tended too much to make the future of Formosa our own issue. Yet we should not exercise any exclusive proprietorship on one side of that issue. We should get as many other nations as we can to stand with us. This can best be done by taking the status of Formosa out of the context of a special situation involving our particular relations with the Peking regime.

Just now things are relatively quiet in the Formosa Strait. The problem is not solved, but it is on the back burner. The Communist adversary is not putting the heat on, and in this sense the strong position taken by this government last fall has been borne out by events. On the other hand, the Communist adversary did win from our side a disavowal of active ambitions to impose the Formosa regime on the mainland. This action of disavowal was a significant concession.

I suggest that this is probably a good time to start further modifying some of our positions in that area. I would suggest we explore the matter along the following lines: A unilateral statement by our government, taking note of the easing of the threat of force in the Formosa Strait, and making clear our willingness accordingly to enter into diplomatic relations with the Peking regime; also, a diplomatic effort to get others—the British, and the Pacific Dominions of the Commonwealth especially—to associate themselves with us in the defense of Formosa, and probably an effort to give a UN cover to the position. We would, in effect, be interpreting the easing of the situation as indicating that the Peking regime does, *de facto*, accept the present status of Formosa, though we would understand its reluctance to manifest this in an explicit backdown.

THIS COURSE would presumably involve, collaterally, getting the Chinese Nationalists to pull out of Quemoy and Matsu. It is unsound for them to be there. It is unsound for us to be vicariously involved in their occupancy. We should not forget that these islands, in sight of the mainland, have traditionally been considered as politically attached to the mainland—in contrast, of course, to Formosa. Their indigenous population is small—in the instance of Quemoy, only slightly more than half of the numbers of Nationalist troops deployed to that island—and certainly not so large but that those who wished could be transported away if necessary in the interest of larger considerations. Any Chinese Government on the mainland would be under compulsion to control these island areas, and it is a mistake to assume that the dispute over these off-shore islands arises solely from the Cold War—that is, arises from the Communist character of the mainland regime. So long as we remain vicariously involved in those positions we have liabilities without authority and without responsibilities. It is an unnecessarily risky position, of no good to us, and we should ease off our involvement there as soon and as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gracefully—rather, with as little awkwardness—as we can.

I can imagine that many would object to our doing any such thing on grounds of its bad effects on the morale of the regime on Formosa. I cannot entirely dismiss this. I recall Under-Secretary Herter's use of the word "patho-logical" to describe the Formosa regime's attachment to present positions—a strong word. But surely it is wrong when grave issues are permitted to ride on the subjective views of others, and for our policy to be made subordinate to such factors merely puts it in ransom to any subjective state of mind that someone else might wish to invoke. A saving element would be, of course, that any withdrawal from the offshore positions would not be under duress but would be in deference to policy objectives which we come to of our own accord. The Chinese on Formosa would also get the benefit of a widened guarantee. In my view, it was an act of folly ever to get prestige committed to the offshore islands—folly on the part of the Nationalists and on our part as well—and the best time to think about an extrication is right away.

We should also have to make clear that our recognition of the regime on Formosa is based on the idea of its being what it is—a Chinese Government in *de facto* existence on an insular territory not part of the Chinese mainland. This again would be difficult for those in authority on Formosa, whose view of themselves tends so much to be based on fictitious elements rather than facts, but I think this is a price that already has been paid in fact and the only loss will be the subjective one of having to face up to what is already true.

Now it may well be that the Peking regime would decline to enter into diplomatic relationships with us on this basis. Yet our government should give it a try. Even if it led no further, we should have demonstrated our own willingness to deal with them. The onus of prolonging the present lack of communication, with all its implicit dangers, would be clearly on the Chinese Communists rather than in some degree on us, too.

Obviously the phasing of any such undertaking is difficult. We should have to sound out allies first and determine their willingness to join with us in protecting Formosa in the sequel to any such action on our part.

Secretary Dulles has expressed his repugnance for the idea that we should ever strike bargains that sell out the positions of third parties. This is correct enough, and it is probable that it will be a long time before any great power would dare undertake to go through with a Munich exercise, even if it wished to. In this instance, however, it is clear that we would not be sacrificing any of the facts of the Formosa position; we would be bringing policy into line with the facts.

Khrushchev recently threw out for consideration the idea of a denuclearized zone in the Pacific—a rather vague proposition, but one whose implications we should not ignore. It would be clearly in our interest to work such a thing out, if possible. Admittedly, Khrushchev's mentioning the matter is not necessarily a sign of its feasibility; it would obviously take a lot of doing. Yet we should demonstrate our willingness to explore any such proposal to the limit. That would entail establishing a better channel of communication than the small and roundabout one we presently have with the Peking regime. If such an undertaking is to be proved impossible, at least it should not be proved from want of any necessary action on our part.

WHAT are some of the considerations that would probably be invoked against the approach I have indicated? It might be argued that any step along these lines is a step toward the seating of the Communist Chinese in the UN. Well, I should say that that is probably going to happen sometime anyway, whether we like it or not. It may be said also that the Chinese Communists then would fall heir to the veto in the Security Council, but this seems not of the first order of importance to me, because the fact of the matter is, whatever the juridic situation, the Peking regime *does* exercise a veto on accommodations in the Pacific area anyway. Moreover, the fact is that in the Korean armistice bargaining the UN did come to terms with the Communist Chinese, though they were found to have been aggressively involved in the conflict. This seems to me to be vastly more important in its implications than the suggested shift in the UN franchise. The United Nations aspect of the matter is fairly complex but not insuperably difficult. The US position in any general adjustment should certainly include, as one point, an insistence that the Chinese Nationalist Government be accorded a continuing place in the General Assembly.

It might be argued that the effect of the course I suggest on the overseas Chinese areas in the Far Pacific area would be deleterious. This argument was made strongly in the paper put out last year by the State Department in explanation of US policy toward the Peking regime. With all respect, I am skeptical of this consideration. The overseas Chinese are canny enough to orient their attitudes on their estimates of the facts and their concrete problems in commerce as related to the mainland regime. I doubt that they base their actions and sympathies simply on the juridic aspects of Washington's attitude. I believe their disapproval of the commune experiment in mainland China is a far more weighty factor in determining the views of the overseas Chinese than is the question of formal diplomatic relations.

Then there is a question of the effect on various Asian regimes allied with us. This, too, is invoked as an argument for preserving the political *status quo* in the Pacific. I suggest that attitudes here again will depend on our allies' estimate of our long-run intrepidity rather than on our sticking to present theories.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deliberate, Yes—Speed, No

Concluding Report on Southerners and Schools

by HELEN FULLER

THIS YEAR the balance will tip against "massive resistance" to the Supreme Court's 1954 order to desegregate public schools. In late 1958, four and a half years after the decision, four of the 11 states of the old Confederacy were complying with it—in their fashion. Seven remained defiant. The division became six to five after the courts opened Virginia's school doors in December. And next fall, when Dade County admits Negroes to a Miami, Florida, elementary school, the balance will shift to seven to four — with compliers leading.

But don't expect more such quick capitulations. The Deep South states, from South Carolina to the Mississippi, have dug in for the duration. Most of the men elected to high office in those states last year won because they promised to keep Negroes out of the schools. Such sure-fire vote-getting issues are rare, and they intend to keep this one hot as long as they can. Segregationist leaders with a more objective view see bigger things to be gained by delaying the final surrender: a chance in 1960 to try a long-shot plan to nullify the decision of 1954; and time for the North, East and West to experience the effects of the mass migration of Negroes which, without much notice, has already nationalized the race question.

To them, the delay is more important than the cost. If it is necessary to close all the public schools to prevent desegregation they are willing to do it, and most of their constituents would back them up—for a while. It is impossible to tell how long most people would be content to do without public schools. But probably not as long as Herman Talmadge, who says "Forever." The leaders seem sure that they could organize and begin to operate private schools, supported by state tuition grants to pupils, before the parents' patience expired, and the successful Front Royal boycott of the desegregated Warren County High School has strengthened their confidence.

HELEN FULLER, *a Southerner by birth and education, recently completed a tour of the South.*

But a preliminary study of the economic consequences of liquidating public education, made by University of Virginia Professor Lorin Thompson, shows that this would be a slightly larger job than most enthusiasts for the substitute system yet confess:

> A few facts taken from the annual reports of the Superintendent of Public Instruction and other state reports show the magnitude of the problem in quantitative terms. First of all the total value of all school property in Virginia in 1957 was reported to be $576 million. Of this amount $524 million represented sites and buildings, $42 million furniture and equipment and just under $10 million represented school buses. . . . The total net debt owed by the city and county school boards is in excess of $200 million and current annual expenditures are more than $200 million. . . . It is sheer speculation as to what proportion of the value each community might recover from the sale of its surplus school building sites, furniture and equipment. One thing is certain, the bond holders would have in excess of $200 million owed them and would require immediate settlement. . . . If school buildings were sold to private school groups the financial underwriting necessary for the acquisition of property now valued at approximately $600 million would be a most substantial undertaking. Long established private schools have not found it easy to borrow money for new facilities. . . .

This, of course, is but one of the many complications that would arise, and unquestionably, even with the best of luck, the private school plan would mean a gigantic educational loss to the state. With great effort, however, determined men might make such a substitute limp along well enough to mollify public distress for a few years—long enough for the last-ditch segregationists to try two desperate gambles.

Ever since Rutherford B. Hayes won the election of 1876 over Samuel J. Tilden in the Electoral College (185-184), minority political blocs have dreamed of being the balance of power in another such coup. Loyal Dixiecrats have dreamed of it since 1944. By holding out

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their combined electoral votes in a tight Presidential contest, States Rights Southerners picture themselves deciding the contest and naming their price, as their Confederate granddaddies did, when by the Compromise of 1877 they elected Hayes and committed him to freeing the South from the 14th Amendment.

This vision now haunts even such pragmatists as Herman Talmadge. "It's the only way we can fight back, build a counter-force to match the NAAPC [sic], and let the parties choose between us," he says earnestly. "And until the South can do that, we won't get anywhere." How many electoral votes would it take? "Well, it is theoretically possible that Georgia's 32 votes alone could be decisive—if the election was close enough, but we might get together as many as 75 to 80." (The votes of Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana total 150). Who would organize it? "Those young Governors of Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina are the ones to do it. Georgia has a law setting the electors free to vote as they please, regardless of party—it was put on the books while I was Governor. So has Alabama. And I think Arkansas has, or is getting one. Mississippi would go along with us, I think."

Then in the unusual event that Nixon and Stevenson —or any other pair of nominees—had run and failed to get a majority of the electoral votes, not including the 75-80 votes the Talmadge-Faubus contingent was holding out, the segregationists would be sitting in the catbird seat. What would your terms be then, I asked Talmadge? "I would run it like an old-fashioned Jewish fire sale—take bids." Whichever party agreed in advance to the Compromise of 1961, freeing the South a second time from observance of the 14th Amendment, would win the Presidency in 1960.

If it turns out that the American electorate does not cooperate, the bitter-enders will need to buy more time. For then they will have to fall back on their final contention that the rest of the country does not really want to practice racial equality any more than does the South. Senator Russell's proposed bill to speed the process of dispersing the Negro population more evenly over the US by federal subsidies to Southern Negroes who volunteer to move to areas where fewer Negroes live has been taken by many as a cynical joke. But he and hundreds—if not thousands—of other Southern opinion makers sincerely believe that ignorance more than anything else accounts for the Northern position on segregation. And they wait impatiently for the rest of white America to wake up to what they are sure will be the disillusionment of living at close quarters with the Negro.

White segregationist leaders think the demographic facts are working for them. They cite a recent study of Negro migration made at Princeton University: "There were more Negroes in the North in 1950 than in all the Confederacy at the time of the Civil War. . . .

> The trend is clearly seen when the five Southern and the five Northern states with the largest Negro populations are contrasted. In 1910, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Virginia had a Negro population of 4.5 million; in 1960, 4.6 million.
>
> In 1910 Illinois, Michigan, New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania together had only 566,000 Negroes; in 1950, 3.2 million. These five Northern states absorbed half the national increase in 40 years, while the five Southern states absorbed little more than a thirtieth of the increase.
>
> In recent years this trend has been accelerating. In the decade between 1940 and 1950, the Negro population declined slightly in the five Southern states while the five Northern states absorbed 54 percent of the national increase. California, Florida and Texas absorbed an additional 22 percent.

Because of this massive migration North and West from the rural South "the stereotype of the Negro as a toiling sharecropper is becoming as antiquated as that of the slaves in the cotton fields," the Princeton study points out. "A new stereotype is evolving, though, and it is that of the lowest tenth living in squalor and disorganization in teeming slums . . . the problems of social and economic retardation that were products of the life in the rural South have been transferred to the metropolitan areas of the North."

Segregationist strategists count on the transfer of this burden to produce new allies in Congress against extending federal guarantees of civil rights. If it takes a while for white Northerners to learn where their self-interest lies, the Southern segregationists are willing to wait—and suffer an under-educated generation of children as the price.

IN THE seven states of the old Confederacy which have chosen the course of token accession to the authority of the Supreme Court the interest of the leaders is in making social change as painless—and as slight—as possible. They consider grandiose schemes to prevent the inevitable a waste of everybody's time. But they are no less resolved than the Talmadges to stick to the old way of doing things wherever they can. And as time goes on, Southern ingenuity will no doubt produce some interesting maneuvers for evading the Supreme Court's intent in the case of *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka* (May 17, 1954).

These states are giving immediate priority to setting up a court-proof plan for subsidizing private schools with public money. All of them have black-belt areas which would revolt against any state administration which failed to provide such an alternative to desegregated public schools. But in any case more private schools are needed as safety valves in the long transition period ahead. Many localities are quietly doing what James F.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Byrnes advised five years ago. Fearing the verdict his former colleagues of the Supreme Court were about to hand down, Mr. Byrnes told his fellow South Carolinians that "to meet this situation we are forced to do now what we should have been doing for the past 50 years." Making "separate" facilities for Negroes "equal" was what he had in mind. (South Carolina the previous year had reported current expenditures per white pupil double those for Negroes—$195.50 and $98.14 respectively. And that ratio prevailed generally throughout the South.)

The states have not kept separate records on educational spending for the two races since 1954, but almost everywhere one travels across the South there are new Negro school buildings under construction or recently completed. School boards and taxpayers view this as one of the most practical ways to limit desegregation. Negro children may choose to stay in a Negro school rather than transfer to a white school if the former is more modern and attractive than the latter, they believe. In Charlottesville, Virginia, this was reported to be the case. And Front Royal expects it to prove true when a new Negro school opens there next fall.

Where there are no new buildings to attract Negro children to the schools where whites wish them to go, gerrymandering is accomplishing much the same purpose. In most communities a little judicious fiddling with the boundary lines of school districts produces the desired black-and-white pattern. Most Southern cities had taken this step well in advance of 1954. Others are adjusting district boundaries to follow the color line.

In older communities where whites and Negroes live mixed in together by custom dating back to slave days more drastic remedies are required. Officials in these places laughingly explain that they have a long way to go to catch up with the North in segregating housing. And a good deal of catching up is being done. White banks which never granted credit for Negro housing before are financing middle-class Negro developments in the suburbs—new and modern, but segregated. The Federal Urban Renewal Program is transplanting more Negroes from mixed downtown areas to segregated projects on the outskirts. As Southerners grasp the central fact in the recent report of the Commission on Race and Housing, signed by such men as Henry Luce and Elliott Bell—that housing policy currently dominates the whole issue of segregation in the US—they will act on it to construct a more solid foundation for segregation. But in the process, many Negro families will move from unspeakable squalor into homes from which children can more easily make the transition to desegregated schools when the time comes.

All this suggests for the future a very "deliberate" rate of speed toward desegregation. And if the task of bringing about compliance with the law respecting the schools remains—as it is now—the concern of only one of the three branches of the federal government, it will indeed be a slow process. The Judiciary, lacking the active support of the Legislative and Executive departments, is necessarily limited in power. It must proceed case by case, school district by school district, to determine where good faith compliance is not forthcoming.

It may take years to define the tests of good faith with respect to the Alabama Pupil Placement Law, which now becomes central to the litigation over the schools. Because the Court ruled that law was constitutional on its face, other states have adopted similar statutes as an escape route from the 1954 order. Judgment on the constitutionality of these measures will hinge on how they are generally applied, not on any one case. And if it takes as long to determine "good faith" in the case of admission of Negroes to schools as it has in their admission to duty as jurors, it will be quite a while. *Neal v. Delaware*, establishing the rights of Negroes as jurors, was decided by the Supreme Court in 1880, and cases arising from that decision are still coming through the courts.

There is little reason either to believe that desegregation will gather momentum as it goes. Fisk University sociologist Dr. Herman Long writes that:

> positive policies toward desegregation do not easily and naturally diffuse from one area to another. The established ways of doing things, custom and habit, tend to create resistances which segment the changed situations and cause them to stand relatively independent of each other.

He comments as an aside that desegregation has not "diffused" even from the golf course where he has played for several years to the rest of the all-white park which surrounds it.

There are those who see "diffusion" as a greater force than Dr. Long does. But few who have studied recent events in the South share commentator Chet Huntley's view that segregation would disappear more rapidly if the NAACP ceased its legal attacks on the institution. It is hard to find a single significant example of voluntary desegregation which has occurred without legal action or threat of it. And if "deliberate speed" is construed as less than the next hundred years, "diffusion" won't produce change in time for that deadline.

But there are other forces that may speed things up in the South. Congress could—and may—decide to give its moral support to the position taken by the Supreme Court. (Sen. Paul Douglas' proposed Civil Rights Act of 1959, embodying Section III as deleted from the Civil Rights Law passed last year, is not likely to receive favorable consideration. But some compromise between the President's and Sen. Lyndon Johnson's much more modest proposals can probably be passed if Senator John-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

son puts his mind to it.) Or another President two years from now could decide to exercise the authority of his office in that direction. Either or both could vastly change the outlook—and could have at any time since May, 1954.

Even if the courts are left to enforce the 14th Amendment virtually alone, however, there will be changes in the South which can make that task less unbearable. The mass migration of Negroes in the past 10 years has been within the South as well as outside it, and always to the city. The number of Negro farmers in the South declined 17.1 percent in the four years from 1950 to 1954, until by 1954 there were only 160,000 farms operated by Negro sharecroppers in the South. And as they move to the city, rural Southern Negroes begin to vote. As the Negro vote climbs in city after city, the interest of elected officials in enforcing civil rights grows, as Atlanta, Knoxville, Nashville and New Orleans demonstrate.

Negro leaders in these and most other cities of the South are aware that the vote is the ultimate power and are giving increasing priority to registration and voter education through the churches as well as through the NAACP and fraternal organizations. One of the first activities Martin Luther King inaugurated when he was called to his church in Montgomery was a weekly meeting to instruct church members in the techniques of registration and voting.

Today the Southern Regional Council estimates there are 1.2 million Negroes on the voting rolls in the 11 Southern states. This represents a steady growth of suffrage since white primaries were outlawed in 1944. And if Negro voting increases proportionately with Negro migration from the farms to Southern cities, pressure on elected officials to get on with desegregation will mount substantially.

UNIVERSITY of Alabama political scientist Donald Strong reminds us, however, that the recent rate of growth in the Negro vote may not continue. He wonders whether "we have not perhaps reached a temporary plateau in the move toward re-enfranchisement of the Southern Negro."

> In its unvarnished form, the proposition is that in most areas of the South, a Negro with political consciousness, who really wants to vote, can overcome the relatively mild obstacles in his way. Similarly, in the rural black belt the obstacles are so formidable and the number of politically-conscious Negroes so relatively few that it is hard to foresee a substantial increase in registration in the near future.

Strong says that part of the problem of increasing the number of voters is that of overcoming indifference to politics on the part of many. "If all extra-legal obstacles to Negro voting could suddenly be swept away, Negroes would not rush to the polls," he states. It was not, after all, until 36 years after women had been given the vote, in 1916, that they voted in substantially the same numbers as men. He draws another analogy with various immigrant groups, and says only when these had produced their own lawyers and prosperous merchants were they able to command a respectful hearing in politics. "Negroes, too, must develop a corps of middle-class leaders with substantial education and economic independence of whites. . . . Despite the progress of the past decade, it is probable that the second million votes will come harder."

Yet, it is certain that the migration from the country to the city will mean better schools for the Negro and more income too as a rule—which will contribute toward developing more competent leadership for the continuing test of strength which will go on for years.

But the Southern Negro is only one aspect of a vast change in prospect. "The South is no longer the Economic Problem Number One of the Nation," Walter Prescott Webb, the Texas historian whose book, *Divided We Stand*, inspired Franklin Roosevelt's Southern Economic Committee in depression days, pointed out in an address last year comparing 1950 with 1930. "In many ways," Professor Webb says, "it looks like the Number One economic opportunity."

> The South today has a latent industrial trinity that may be as potent in the future as coke and coal, limestone and iron have been in the past. The South has a complete monopoly on one of these, more than half of the second, and about one-half of the third. This trinity is hydrocarbons, sulphur and water which exist to-

Reprints Available of

"SOUTHERNERS AND SCHOOLS"

Helen Fuller's seven articles on how Southern States have responded to the Supreme Court's desegregation decision and the adjustments that are still to come have been assembled in a booklet.

Single copy—35 cents
10 copies—$3
50 copies—$12
100 copies—$20

●

Order today from

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gether along the Gulf Coast. They are the basis of the petrochemical industry which is already concentrated in that area and growing at such a rate that no one can calculate its future. The North has no sulphur and less than five percent of the hydrocarbons. In this new chemical trinity it has nothing but water . . . industry is coming from all corners . . . to all parts of the South, promising to make the Gulf Coast a golden crescent. Not only is industry coming, but people are coming too. . . . The South that formerly exported its talent and imported its capital is now importing talent and exporting capital. . . . The New England textile factories are moving to Virginia and the Carolinas. To Dallas came airplane factories and all their trained personnel, whole trainloads. The petrochemical companies line the Gulf Coast. The depletion of the Mesabi Range may transfer much of the steel industry to the South to use the baser ore, and to receive that which will come up from South America.

Twenty thousand new corporations were formed in the South in 1957. And the percentage of income derived from manufacturing in the South that year increased by five percent, compared to three percent for the country as a whole.

All of this points to more urbanization. (The region is now about half urban and half rural). The South which has never had a city of a million should have half a dozen in less than 10 years. In that same span every good-sized town will be tied in with hundreds of others through the new federal highway network which will give the South almost 250,000 miles of new roads, 40,000 miles of superhighways, bringing tourists and new ways of looking at things. "The bright lights of the highway cloverleafs will shine on the Ku Klux Klan before they can get five miles away from a cross-burning. And anyway the new roads will give the Kluxers so many places to go they won't be bothering people out of idleness," one Southern optimist observes.

In the next decade the South will rapidly take on the look of the rest of the country. And when it accepts the fact that it is bound by the same laws, it can join the rest of the country in searching for answers to race problems.

Dying Days for Dictators

Latin America Unites for Insurrection

by RUTH NORDHAUS PEARSON

Caracas

A WEEK after the fall of Batista, exiles from the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay met in several Latin American capitals to plan three revolutions. In Caracas, the meetings looked—at first glance—like a businessmen's convention. But the agenda was the strategy of insurrection. Significantly, the sessions were semi-public. At each there were as many Venezuelans as exiles.

It used to be that Latin American exiles were awkward company. One felt sympathetic to their cause, but it was impossible to share their conviction of ultimate triumph. Things have changed. Today, exiles plotting revolutions against remaining strongmen are the heroes and the hope of a Latin America that is determined to eliminate its dictators and is willing to collaborate with and contribute to the exiles' projects. When Fidel Castro flew to Caracas in January to show his gratitude for Venezuela's support to Cuba's cause, he donated the first bolivars for the liberation of the Dominican Republic. The rector of the state-run Venezuelan university and other dignitaries sold bonds on the streets of Caracas in a million-bolivar ($300,000) fund-raising drive similar to the one successfully held the previous year for Cuba's rebels. Venezuelan businessmen, union leaders, congressmen and a fighting editor-priest joined Dominican exiles. The objective: overthrow of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.

Such semi-official endorsement of exile movements working to overturn governments with which these same countries maintain officially friendly relations is not recommended in protocol textbooks but is possible because it represents a popular aspiration of all people below the Rio Grande. If rebel groups succeed—and the historical moment is in their favor—their accomplishment will push the 20 Latin American republics much

RUTH NORDHAUS PEARSON *has been living in South America for the past five years, writing for newspapers in Texas, Mexico and Venezuela.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

closer toward the formation of a regional bloc—an economic and political force to be respected in the future.

The idea is an old one called Bolivarism. Bolivar's dying comment, "I have plowed in the sea," was his admission that although he had freed half a continent, he had failed to strengthen the mutual bonds that would protect individual nations from future tyrants. His failure, plus the ambitions of *caudillos* and the lack of democratic traditions following the wars for independence, doomed most of Latin America to more than a century of dictatorships. The hopes of constitutional governments flickered fitfully toward the end of World War II and in early postwar years, but newly-organized political parties lacked experienced leaders and were too anxious to enforce reforms overnight. Creole oligarchies viewed change with suspicion and alarm, labelled sudden social changes as Marxist maneuvering, and urged the military to step in.

They did. And a shadowy international fraternity of military dictators replaced elected governments in a series of coups which ended with Fulgencio Batista's Cuban take-over in 1952 and Carlos Castillo Armas' Guatemelan revolt in 1954. The strongmen were linked through Argentina's secret military lodges, through personal contacts acquired at Peru's War College, through collaboration of secret police organizations and international agents. They furnished arms for successive assaults on progressive governments, such as the attack on Costa Rica from Nicaragua in 1955. The US provided tacit or open support to many of the dictators in exchange for oil and other concessions—and for anti-Communist declarations. Any military coup which wanted quick recognition from the Department of State had only to announce that it was carrying out "a crusade against Communism." Frequently the "crusade" was against liberal and democratic political parties, such as *Accion Democratica* in Venezuela, *Apra* in Peru, *Liberal* in Colombia, and the *Autentico* and *Ortodoxo* in Cuba —the real bulwarks against Red influence.

Now, the pendulum is swinging in reverse. Increased industrialization has created a combative Latin American proletariat conscious of rights and strength. A more progressive oligarchy, a liberalized intellectual and a Church turned champion of the oppressed have brought into being forces not only hostile to dictators but capable of over-throwing them. Most important, the change has affected the military. In the past four years, constitutionally-minded officers have themselves ousted military dictators and have led their countries toward government by due process.

The year 1955 was the turning point: Juan Domingo Peron was overthrown. In 1956 and 1957, dictators in Peru, Haiti, Honduras and Colombia were out of the way; by 1958, military and civilian forces in Venezuela combined to crush the 10-year regime of General Marcos Perez Jimenez. When it came Cuba's turn, a new and important factor emerged. For the first time, an inner rebellion was actively an inter-American cause. Castro's revolutionary army received not only individual contributions from sympathizers throughout Latin America and the US, but also in the form of arms shipments from at least two governments. He publicly acknowledged a planeload of weapons sent by former President Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, and it is common knowledge that the Venezuelan Provisional Junta under Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal also shipped arms.

The precedent was set and exile committees were quickly organized throughout the hemisphere to forward the liberation movement. Experienced leaders such as President of Venezuela Romulo Betancourt are today calling for collective action to expel Trujillo, Stroesner and Somoza from the Organization of American States. Those not in official positions are working more directly. A commercial radio station in Caracas nightly airs a Dominican exile program heard in Trujilloland, urging Dominicans to organize, await orders. The Venezuelan Congress, whose members count between them 2,000 years of exile, prison and torture under the Perez Jimenez regime, devotes considerable time to discussion of ways of ridding Latin America of remaining dictators.

All this could be called intervention—or self-defense. Democratic leaders in Latin America know from experience that the *caudillos,* unless overthrown or isolated by a *cordon sanitaire,* will collaborate with local reactionary elements, both military and civilian, in attempts to overthrow new democratic governments. They especially fear the durable and well-armed Trujillo, whose agents operate with impunity even in the US.

HOPES for a free America were given new impulse February 15 when a document of great historic significance, known as the "Declaration of Caracas," was signed by political leaders throughout Latin America who attended the inauguration of President Betancourt. The declaration calls for expulsion of representatives of dictators from the OAS, specifically naming the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Paraguay, and urges a "policy of progressive integration and unity of Latin America, with economic goals such as the common market." A carefully worded statement on relations with the US says:

> We consider that a united free and strong Latin America can establish and maintain equitable and fruitful relations with the United States of America, based on democratic inter-Americanism and international economic justice.

The implication is that "democratic inter-Americanism and international economic justice" is not presently the basis of relations with the powerful neighbor in the north and will not be until Latin America unites. Among the signers are Jose Figueres, ex-President of Costa Rica;

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Eduardo Frei, head of Chile's Christian Democrat Party, and Salvador Allende, who narrowly missed the presidency of Chile as candidate of a leftist coalition; Andres Townsend, Foreign Relations Secretary of Peru's *Apra* Party; and Gabriel del Mazo, Argentine minister of defense, regarded as possible successor to Frondizi. Betancourt didn't sign, but leaders of his party did, together with top figures of other Venezuelan political groups.

An antecedent of the "Declaration of Caracas" was a meeting called by then exiled Betancourt in Havana in 1950. It was attended by two men who are now Presidents: Manuel Urrutia of Cuba and Arturo Frondizi of Argentina, and by Figueres, Allende, Townsend and others. It should not be missed that one element of great stability in the Latin American situation is the skein of close personal ties and loyalties which unite many of the political leaders who have recently come, or may come, to power. This is partly the result of long years of peregrination through many countries by political exiles of liberal views, and partly due to common language and culture. One gets the impression that Latin American political leadership is now a club affair, having the advantage of cutting down complicated protocol and tightening inter-American solidarity.

Fidel Castro is of a younger generation and not yet a member of the club. Possibly the Membership Committee is withholding an invitation until he proves his political maturity. But Castro's recent achievement and forceful personality, as well as his power to explain profound ideas in simple terms, has made him the current symbol of Latin America's aspirations. He has made rash and provocative statements, which he has later had to contradict or retract, on inter-American relations and particularly on relations with the US. While much of what he has said has been based on truths, he is learning that diplomacy demands restraint. In any case, a glance at the club roster shows that the movement for Latin American integration is presently headed by men who are experienced politicians and statesmen—generally willing to cooperate with the US, but on a basis of "neither colonial submission nor aggressive provocation," as Betancourt recently worded it.

WASHINGTON has probably been let off more easily than it deserves in its relations with Latin America —the attacks on Nixon notwithstanding. The restoration of freedom in a series of Latin American countries could easily have been accompanied by explosive attacks on the US and a serious deterioration of relations. But leaders of liberal parties are more interested in establishing a new set of working relations than in raking up the interventions, political and economic pressures, and omissions of the past.

It remains to be seen what attitude toward the US will emerge in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua when those nations are freed, events which could occur within the year. Present regimes in both countries trace their origins back to days when the US still wielded the original Big Stick. Trujillo was a national guard officer under orders of the US military occupation in the Dominican Republic, and later used that position as a springboard to power. The Marines had just left Nicaragua after their fruitless pursuit of Augusto Sandino when the elder Somoza, founder of the present dynasty, assassinated the rebel leader who had previously spent more than six years fighting US occupation of his country. Somoza later took power in Nicaragua with Washington's blessings.

Now, with Latin American unity becoming a reality, those who fashion US foreign policy must take stock of their position. How far this solidarity could be developed was illustrated by the sympathetic hearing accorded proposals of Chile's Salvador Allende at a meeting of the national committee of *Accion Democratica*, Venezuela's ruling party, in February. Allende, who missed the presidency of Chile by 30,000 votes, was a personal guest at the inauguration of President Betancourt. Among other things, he advocates a common Latin American citizenship, the application of economic sanctions and breaking of relations with governments not freely elected, the unification of all workers' syndicates into one Latin American organization, drastic reductions in military spending, a Latin American news agency, and the Latin American common market.

No such proposals will be adopted by next week, but the fact that they are seriously mentioned by a Latin American political leader of first rank is a sign of what is ahead. The common market is already widely discussed and some preliminary steps toward its formation are not unlikely within the next year.

While responsible promoters of Latin American unity avoid any suggestion that it is aimed at the United States, it is based on a concept of—and gets its emotional force from—common language, culture, history and economic interests, few if any of which the US shares. As such, it is inherently opposed to the old concept of a Pan American community with the US as its natural leader.

Latin American solidarity is new, and in many ways it will be interesting to watch. Only one factor could possibly clip its wings—the fall of any of the democracies into new dictatorships. But democracies have learned to defend themselves. When the liberal government of Honduran President Ramon Villeda Morales was recently threatened by a military coup, democratic leaders of Latin America rallied to Villeda's support. The majority party of Peru immediately announced its solidarity with Villeda. Cuba's President Manuel Urrutia said that "brigades of Cuban volunteers are ready to fight in Honduras" and President Betancourt cabled Villeda that "Venezuela is ready to defend your democracy in the form necessary." If no man is an island, neither is a country.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

Safari Among The Wariri

by Reed Whittemore

The New Republic was the only major weekly or monthly in the country (approximately) not to review Saul Bellow's new novel in its first week of publication. A fortunate occurrence. Now I can sit down and be among the first to review the reviews.

I surveyed nine reviews. In them Saul Bellow's hero was compared to Don Quixote (thrice), Tarzan (twice), Gulliver, Everyman, Huck Finn, Daniel, a Connecticut Yankee (twice), Odysseus and Captain Ahab. Bellow's prose was found to be masterly, exemplary, supercharged (this was bad), vivid, turbulent (this was good), brilliant and labored. Bellow's story was characterized as fantastic, melodramatic, unrealistic, ironic, anarchic, frenzied (this was good), and "not essentially parodic." It was concrete for some, abstract for others. The whole performance was approved by four, disapproved by five.

Henderson the Rain King, by Saul Bellow (Viking; $4.50).

Well, now, Bellow himself stepped into this phrase factory a week before it opened. He wrote a lead piece for the Sunday *Times* Book Section in which he explained that he was much interested in the matters about which the reviewers, as it turned out, were about to talk, and particularly in that little matter of the abstract *vs.* the concrete. In a judicious moment he observed that "while our need for meanings is certainly great our need for concreteness, for particulars, is even greater." Indeed, he went to some lengths to ridicule meaning-hunters for being snobbish, idolatrous of culture, and excessively solemn. The piece was titled "Deep Readers of the World, Beware."

It is not often that a writer has a chance to tell his reviewers what they should argue about. I say this without irony; I mean simply that I think we are fortunate in having Bellow on the scene here. I doubt that he would have said what he said in the *Times*, just before the publication of his new book, if he had not had in the back of his mind the notion that meaning-hunters would soon be descending upon it. And what could have given him this notion but a reading of his own book? "Henderson" is one of those books clearly constructed for the delight and despair of meaning-hunters. One simply can't read it—even after reading Bellow in the *Times*—without looking at its story and its characters with an English Department's suspicion. What is the story *really* about?

The story has been summarized at some length in all the reviews I have read, so I will forego here the pleasure of describing in detail how the middle-aged Henderson bombed the frogs and wowed the lions on his African junket. I cannot, however, neglect so readily the significance of these activities; it seems to me important to observe that the story *is* allegorical (though it is also massively concrete) and that, therefore, its readers probably ought to sit down and figure out what it is an allegory of. Most of the reviewers took a stab at this, and there seemed to be general agreement that hero Henderson was on a spiritual quest (like Don Quixote and all those others) for greater Fullness of Being; further, that he achieved a measure of success in his search, while living among the Wariri. There, as *Time* put it, he was helped to "break the cycle of Becoming for the Serenity of Being."

What was it that the Wariri provided him with?—"a shot in the arm from animal nature." This "shot" had been prescribed earlier by references to the prophecy of Daniel which, Henderson said, he "had never been able to shake off—'They shall drive you from among men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts of the field'." Nebuchadnezzar, to whom the prophecy was originally addressed, didn't believe the prophecy; but when it came to pass he submitted to it gracefully and discovered that the results were excellent:

> I Nebuchadnezzar lifted up mine eyes unto Heaven, and mine understanding returned unto me, and I blessed the Most High. . . .
>
> At the same time my reason returned unto me; and for the glory of my kingdom, mine honour and brightness returned unto me; and my counsellors and my lords sought unto me; and I was established in my kingdom, and excellent majesty was added to me.

Like Nebuchadnezzar, hero Henderson was rejuvenated at the end. As we left him he was looking forward to meeting the girl he had discouragedly left a while back; he felt healthy and ready to take on his "kingdom" again:

> Laps and laps I galloped around the shining and riveted body of the plane, behind the fuel trucks. Dark faces were looking from within. The great, beautiful propellers were still, all four of them. I guess I felt it was my turn now to move, and so went running—leaping, leaping, pounding, and tingling over the pure white lining of the gray Arctic silence.

In other words Henderson had had the shot in the arm he needed out there in Bellow's curious Africa, and was headed back, as the curtain fell, to tell us all, or at least friend Lily, that it would be good for modern civilization to go live with the beasts of the field for a piece. Amen.

Now it is always disconcerting and depressing to come upon the bare bones of some hopeful organic unity in a bumbling review, to see the remains of the great or small creation all stretched out helplessly before a laboratory man whose primary interest in them is in getting some sort of a grade for his naming of parts. The "Henderson" occasion is especially disconcerting because Bellow has left us instructions, both in the book and in the piece in the *Times*, that his cadaver should not be so treated. Why?—because "Henderson" is a story against laboratory men and laboratory procedures, is against, in an odd way, what it is. The novelist who doesn't like meanings writes an allegory; the allegory means that men should not mean but be. Ods bodkins.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The reviewer looks at the evidence and wonders if he should damn the author and praise the book, or praise the author and damn the book. And is it possible, somehow or other, to praise, or damn, both?—he isn't sure.

We see the results of this dilemma among those reviewers who were uncertain about how "serious" the book was. Charles Rolo (the *Atlantic*) put the confusion most plainly when he observed that although he didn't think the novel was intended as a parody it certainly read that way. What is involved here, I think, is the nature and extent of Bellow's commitment to his story. Nobody can deny that the particulars are there, that Henderson's world has been, as Paul Pickrel (*Harper's*) put it, "vividly and brilliantly imagined." But the particulars are so clearly hokum that one is hardly disposed to reckon with them except as jokes, sometimes very good jokes:

> And I began to drink, harder than ever, and was drunk in every one of the great cathedrals—Amiens, Chartres, Vezelay, and so on.
>
> . . . To break up the tension, however, I said, "Would anybody like to visit my pistol range downstairs?" There were no takers and I went below myself and fired a few rounds. The bullets made a tremendous noise among the hot-air ducts. Soon I heard the visitors saying good-bye.
>
> . . . From here we took a plane to Baventai, an old Bellanca, the wings looked ready to drop off, and the pilot was an Arab and flew with bare feet.
>
> . . . I built an igloo with a knife and during zero weather Lily and I fell out because she wouldn't bring the kids and sleep with me under the skins as the Eskimos do.
>
> . . . As I ate the cocoons and the larvae and ants, crouching in the jockey shorts with the lion lying under me for shade, I spoke oracles and sang . . . while I fondled the animal, which had made a wonderful adjustment to me.

Thus it may be true, as Granville Hicks (*Saturday Review*) said, that Bellow's lions are lions and his pigs pigs, rather than pale symbols; but it is also true that they are curious lions and pigs—or, to bring out the big word for the day, fantasy lions and pigs. The reader is amused by them but not taken in by them. How can he be?—Bellow is not taken in by them; Bellow is busy making the pigs and lions as eccentric and extravagant as he can. And yet, strangely enough, he is asking us—as, say, Max Shulman and S. J. Perlman would not ask us—to imagine that his parody does not extend as far as his theme. He is telling us to be amused by Henderson's shenanigans in a thoroughly shenaniganed Africa, but at the same time to believe—and of course emphasize with—Henderson's "problem." Under such conditions I do not find it surprising that several of the reviewers tended to discount the concreteness of Bellow's story, to discover that "Henderson's moral dilemma is more real than Henderson" (*Time*).

To be ponderous and impressive let me say that Bellow's procedure in "Henderson" is probably attributable to our modern incapacity to take myth, romance, all the really radical kinds of literary artifice as we perhaps ought to (ought to, at least, for the health of literature). Shakespeare, for example, could put before his audience a completely hoked-up woods in "Midsummer Night's Dream," point out that it was "airy nothing," and have characters like Bottom undermine it regularly, while at the same time allowing Puck, Oberon, Titania and the lovers themselves to speak and act in the old somber, heroic way. This mixture of *motifs* is not possible for Bellow apparently; and since I am confident that it would not be possible for me either, I sympathize. My sympathy, though, doesn't make me like "Henderson" any better. I am amused for a while, then fatigued, but never involved. The artifice simply isn't earnest anyplace; only the mind behind the artifice is earnest. A good many of the reviewers pointed, either happily or unhappily, to the imaginative qualities of the book, and I am impressed by them too—one doesn't, for example, run into a frog-bombing every day. But of this quite marvelous imagination I think it is necessary to say that its owner discounted it before I did.

Mr. Hoover as a Terrapin Progressive

by Richard L. Strout

HALF-WAY through this book is the arresting sentence "Both Hoover and Roosevelt were Progressives." It is doubtful if this juxtaposition has often been made before. The narrative continues, "But Hoover was a terrapin Progressive; Roosevelt was an impala Progressive." (The dictionary reveals that an "impala" is some kind of an African antelope, very swift no doubt.)

Professor Warren in his introduction explains the purpose of his book, in which the breath-taking conjunction of Hoover and Roosevelt as "Progressives" gives a hint. He feels that no one "has done justice to the Hoover Administration." The result is a "distorted picture of what some historians are calling 'the age of Roosevelt'." By "some historians" I suppose one should read Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., whose first volume of *The Age of Roosevelt* includes 300 pages on the unfortunate Mr. Hoover. Certainly nobody is likely to read the Schlesinger account and want to elect another Hoover in a hurry. The question is whether they would want to do so after reading the Warren version.

Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression, by Harris Gaylord Warren (Oxford; $7).

I can never forget Mr. Hoover. I used to cover him in the old Department of Commerce building where he sat at the end of a long wooden table looking fixedly down like a man who has just discovered a bug in his soup. He was a pudgy figure in a high stiff collar who undoubtedly knew more about what was going on in Washington than any other man. I was a young reporter then and believed that Hoover would make a great President. It didn't occur to me that perhaps a politician would be a better man to fill a political office. No, the feeling was that a "politician" was just the wrong kind of person for the Presidency; on the same reasoning, I suppose, that you would want somebody other than a vulgar surgeon to remove your appendix.

Then I remember the sadder days as poor Mr. Hoover constantly predicted prosperity and the depression constantly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deepened. I remember the World Series game, in 1932, I think, in which he went in his special train to Philadelphia to throw out the first ball. By that time millions were unemployed. Somehow the incident symbolized the ineptitude that seemed to dog everything the unfortunate man did.

The cameramen wanted shots of Hoover throwing out the ball; Hoover posed for so many pictures that they started the game without him. Only as we waited on the platform that evening did the thought suddenly occur to a press association man that he had never actually seen the ball *thrown*. He went back to the President's car and, sure enough, he was right. For want of a better course the forgotten President had dropped the ball into his pocket.

Professor Warren is determinedly fair, after his own lights, and he omits little of the evidence on which the reader must ultimately decide for himself the rank of Hoover among American Presidents. I confess I read the urbane account with mounting confusion: if Hoover had made the mistakes and miscalculations which Professor Warren is at pains to show he did, how could Warren offer his study as the rehabilitation of reputation he evidently intended? It became a kind of game between this reader and the author to search out the somewhat chary editorial comments of Warren and try to square them with the incidents presented and the initial thesis, offered in the introduction: Hoover was "the greatest Republican of his generation."

Warren agrees that Hoover came to the White House with a press so biased in his favor that editors were justly accused not merely of "not printing the truth" but of "preventing their reporters from reporting the truth." This, says Warren, applied even to "the self-righteous *New York Times*."

Perhaps Warren has forgotten, or doesn't know, the comment of Ogden Nash at the time:

> Like an art lover gazing at the Mona Lisa at the Louvre
> Is Adolph Ochs looking at a portrait of Herbert Hoovre.

I find no reference to the reply Hoover gave in June, 1930, to a delegation of the National Catholic Welfare Council urging on the President instant expansion of Federal public works to aid the desperate unemployed millions. With the martyred patience of a man who listens to something he knows much more about than the speaker Hoover replied, "Gentlemen, you have come 60 days too late. The depression is over."

Hoover vetoed the Norris bill to set up a TVA but signed the abominable Smoot-Hawley tariff act, with the highest rates ever imposed, which brought retaliatory acts by 25 countries in less than a year. He sent Douglas MacArthur out with all his medals to disperse the miserable Bonus Army encamped in their hovels on Pennsylvania Avenue and Anacostia Flats. He put complete faith in an economic philosophy whose failure he could not understand nor accept and even—on occasion—bent facts to fit that philosophy. Professor Warren rejects as an "intemperate accusation" the charge that Hoover was the greatest failure in our history as a crisis-President. But who would the Warren candidate be in this century?

I do not want to be unjust. As long as Professor Warren is permitted to make the criticism himself he gives a fair enough account, using such epithets as "mistakes," "political disaster," "catastrophic." With a pretty wit he explains at one point that "Hoover came to the Presidency with plans and ideas adequate for a future that had already passed." But when others criticize the unfortunate executive, Warren has a tendency to bridle. He calls remarks of Walter Lippmann, for example, at one point, "too glib and pontifical."

Professor Warren's final summary is headed "Greatest Republican of His Generation." He also incorporates this phrase into his introduction. Well, listed as Republicans in that period were Bob LaFollette, Borah, Stimson, Couzens, Hiram Johnson, George Norris and others. But as Raymond Moley who originated the superlative, uses it, it appears to mean the greatest Republican President "of his generation." Let's see—Harding, Coolidge and Hoover. Moley is right.



- as the courageous mediator who was at the center of the Little Rock school crisis . . .
- as a Congressman whose "moderate stand" on school integration cost him the Congressional seat he held for 16 years . . .
- as the party leader who played a key role in keeping the Northern and Southern Democrats together in two national conventions . . .
- as the President of the Southern Baptist Convention (9 million members) who believes the churches have a vital role in desegregation . . .

BROOKS HAYES in his new book, speaks without bitterness or bias for a growing minority of men of good will.

$3.50 at all bookstores

Chapel Hill

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American and British Journalism

by Gerald W. Johnson

TO AN American reader the startling thing about this brilliant essay on modern journalism is its irrelevance —the more startling since the author is an American and a former editor of *Time*. But for some years he has been resident in London and he bases his work on study of two English newspapers, the *London Daily Mirror* and the *Manchester Guardian*. He chose them not because they are the extremes of British journalism but because each is fairly representative of its type, the *Mirror* of the "popular," the *Guardian* of the "quality" press.

The Sugar Pill, by T. S. Matthews (Simon and Schuster; $3.75).

Precisely at that point he goes out of orbit, as far as the vast majority of American newspapermen are concerned. The conditions that produced such newspaper types as the *Mirror* and the *Guardian* do not exist in this country. One finds a faint reflection of them in New York, but nowhere else. These are conditions that make possible not only national papers, but diversity among them.

Chief of these is geography. The *Mirror* has an accessible population of 51 millions, the *Guardian* four-fifths as many. The *New York Times* could theoretically be placed on the breakfast table in the homes of perhaps 20 millions, not more, probably a materially smaller number. The *Times* is representative of the quality press, comparable to the *Guardian*, rather than the *Mirror*, so the fact that its circulation is one-tenth that of the *Mirror* is due in part to its standards. A fairer comparison is with the *New York Daily News*, whose circulation is one-fifth that of the London paper. With the present distribution of population it is not physically possible for any American morning newspaper to attain a circulation of five millions, for none can cover a third of the nation, while the London papers can cover all of Great Britain, small areas near Land's End and John O'Groat's perhaps excepted.

Most American cities can support no more than one morning newspaper and in at least 181 there is no competition because, if there is an evening paper, it is put out by the same management. The single-minded devotion to a particular segment of the population, characteristic of the London papers, is therefore impossible in this country. Occupying a monopoly position the typical American newspaper must serve all classes; it is both the popular *and* the quality press, because there is no other. Hence a great deal of what Mr. Matthews has to say has little or no significance for American newspapermen who work for a different kind of institution.

The first half of this volume accordingly is recommended for its sheer entertainment value. The portraits of the *Mirror* and the *Guardian* may look like the popular concept of Martians rather than like newspapers but the vignettes of C. P. Scott, Northcliffe, Beaverbrook and a dozen other mighty men of valor in British journalism are intensely human and fascinating.

Then in the second half Mr. Matthews gets into stuff that is not merely significant, but highly significant. Here he discusses the nature of journalism itself and what he says is astringent to excess but, as I believe, also tonic. "Not our daily bread, but our sugar pill" is his verdict on the press. It is unjust, but not altogether unjust; illogical, but not altogether so; arrogant, but humble excoriation is a contradiction in terms. Mr. Matthews is most hateful precisely when he comes closest to the truth; his assumption that opinion is not news is blatant superstition, but his assertion that most news is manufactured and a great deal of it poorly manufactured, is hateful truth.

In sum, it can safely be predicted that wherever two or three newspaper craftsmen are gathered together this book may be relied on to start twenty bum arguments in as many minutes; any volume capable of doing that is quite a book.

Notes on Contributors

REED WHITTEMORE, a frequent contributor to this journal, teaches literature at Carleton College in Northfield, Minnesota. RICHARD L. STROUT, a veteran Washington correspondent, last week received the George Polk Memorial Award for "interpretive reporting of the Washington scene."

MOVIES

Old Titles, New Stories

A RECURRENT debate about criticism of films and plays is whether adaptations ought to be considered in relation to their originals or as entities in themselves. Where the original is a work of little importance or reputation, the question can be begged. Otherwise, in my view, reference to the original is unavoidable. Imagine going to see a film advertised as Chekhov's *Sea Gull* and finding that in it Trigorin has been made a Mongol (to suit a Mongolian star), that he does not seduce Nina but has taken a Daddy Longlegs interest in her which blossoms into cozy marriage, and that the character of Konstantine has been excised.

The Sound and the Fury (Twentieth Century-Fox).

Far-fetched as that sounds, it is a fair analogy with what has been done in the film of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*. Quentin (Caddy's brother) has been completely eliminated, along with about half the novel. Jason has been made a Cajun to fit Yul Brynner's accent. He is no longer Caddy's brother; he is the son of Father Compson's second wife by her previous marriage. Thus there is no blood relationship between him and the younger Quentin (Caddy's daughter), and the antagonism between them can blossom into love and probable marriage. This from a novel which Irving Howe calls one of the three or four 20th Century works of prose fiction in which the impact of tragedy is felt and sustained!—which ends with Quentin's flight with a carnival showman and the certainty that, whatever happens to her, the Compson family is doomed.

Make every allowance for the legitimate needs of screen adaptation. Even

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

then, if words mean anything at all, how can this occasionally touching movie of a declining family's regeneration be called a film of Faulkner's work—a book which (to quote Howe again) records "the fall of a house, the death of a society"? If black is white and right is left, which way is up?

An editorial in the current *Esquire* suggests a double standard for criticizing films made from novels: that reviewers should treat such films as complete in themselves because most people haven't read the originals and a review that points out divergences is only spoiling their fun. It is a stirring little crusade for the sacredness of ignorance, and if only our culture can continue to keep most people from reading books, it may prevail.

But let us temporarily adopt *Esquire's* suggestion. This film, then, was made by the same producer and director (Jerry Wald and Martin Ritt) who made an earlier Faulkner derivative, *The Long Hot Summer*. It has the same false Technicolor prettiness, the same generally competent direction. Joanne Woodward, who was in the other film, gives us more of the same quite good performance of a young Southern girl of independent spirit. Ethel Waters is comforting as Dilsey. Yul Brynner does his too-often-seen best as Jason. John Beal is pathetic as the sodden brother, Howard—a character invented for the film, presumably to take up some of the slack caused by dropping (the older) Quentin.

But the only really interesting performance is the Caddy of Margaret Leighton. Miss Leighton seems somewhat worried by the Southern accent, as if she had to carry a bothersome parcel while performing, but she is an artist whose neurotic palette is perfectly suited to the role. Her smallest move is charged with purebred emotion; she can make us feel, in a poignant way, the very fineness of her bones.

WITHIN its own context, the script has inconsistencies and loose ends. How does Jason, who boasts that he is the family mainstay, support them after he hits his employer Earl Snopes? What happened to Quentin's resentment of Caddy because of her mother's reluctance to defend her? Why did Jason tear furiously after the thieving Quentin and her lover only to tell her that she could do what she chose and then leave her? These questions are posed by the script, not the novel.

Still it must be admitted that the screenwriters have nibbled around busily enough in the book to come up with a script of superficial intelligence which contains some good scenes. Most of the sequences with the idiot Benjy (Jack Warden) are effective; several of Miss Woodward's and Miss Leighton's scenes are well composed. But they seem pages from a family album, not elements of a unified progressive drama. The net result of the film, aside from its final note of optimism, is of a sprawling, occasionally gripping fourth carbon-copy of Chekov in Dixie—just another ambling "study" of Southern social disintegration and transition.

What is missing? If *Esquire* will pardon us, Faulkner is missing. The gigantic, death-destined tension is missing. So the point of the work—the force that knits the pieces fiercely together and hurls them forward—is missing. The effect of the film is like hearing snatches of a symphony through closed concert-hall doors.

In the same issue of *Esquire*, Wald is quoted as saying: "Mass audiences are hep now. There are 25 million college graduates." He must be banking on a belief — possibly well-founded — that few of them have read one of the most highly regarded of all American novels and that those few won't care about its perversion. "I'm gonna do Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* next," he says, "and I just bought *Winesburg*." He adds that he also has an option on *Ulysses*.

Why not? With the technique of evisceration and trimming and substitute stuffing that he has perfected, he can make a good neighborhood movie out of any book he chooses. How about Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil?* Gad, what a title!

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

ART

Man's Image at Urbana

AN ELEMENTARY technique in the promotion of a new fashion in art is the systematic creation of the belief that not only is the new fashion fashionable or even the obvious goal toward which art through the centuries has been struggling, but also that the new fashion is the only kind of art now being produced. This belief is created in the first place by ignoring all other artistic production and in the second place by linking the new fashion with one after another of the universally recognized great schools of the past.

An examination of the last several years of *Art News* would disclose that exactly these two things have been done in the magazine's all-out promotion of *Schmeerkunst,* the art form that is finger painting writ large. The magazine's function as a fairly complete record of New York exhibitions has been continued in the brief notices which, like the shipping news or the list of out-of-town buyers in the *Times*, are read by those directly concerned. Feature articles, intended for the widest audience, and especially feature articles with impressive color layouts, have concentrated on one or another aspect or practitioner of *Schmeerkunst* and on important historical exhibitions or new acquisitions of old masters by American museums. As month follows month the casual reader is given a double image: *Schmeerkunst* and Poussin; *Schmeerkunst* and Persian manuscripts; *Schmeerkunst* and Chartres Cathedral; *Schmeerkunst* and the Impressionists; *Schmeerkunst* and the Renaissance decorative arts; even *Schmeerkunst* and Winston Churchill. The inescapable conclusion is that there are two kinds of art, that of the past, from Altamira to Picasso, and *Schmeerkunst*.

The serious harm done to American painting by all this is incalculable, since so much of it has been done to students and younger artists who, either cynically or in pathetic sincerity, have set themselves to unlearn the art of painting before they know anything about it at all. Ours may be the first age of mute inglorious Miltons who are so because they believe that muteness is a virtue.

For the rest of us, happily, the inescapable conclusion is easily escaped. All you have to do is look around and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

right now you could hardly find a better place to look than at the current biennial of contemporary American painting and sculpture at the University of Illinois, Urbana. Dean Allen S. Weller and his staff have assembled 139 works all more or less related to the traditional notion of "the image of man," a theme that Weller explores with great perception in his introduction to the catalogue.

UNLIKE the *Schmeerkunstspielers* of *Art News*, the Illini have no axe to grind. The idea of the image of man is broad enough to take in about everything that is going on. Just about everything is there, but the majority of the paintings and all the sculpture have been executed with the conscious intellect and establish immediate points of contact with a reality beyond that of paint itself.

A solid base is established by a group of first-rate pieces by artists of stature who have been in business for some years. This demonstrates a continuity in American contemporary art that the *Schmeerkunst* Ministry of Information has been at some pains to deny. Items: a fierce and flaming Rattner "Moses," an austere "Black Patio Door" by Georgia O'Keefe, a witty and poignant Levine of a "Black Freighter" seen from the shore by a pair of New York Puerto Ricans, a monumental female torso and head disappearing into light and shadow by Balcomb Greene, a jazzy Stuart Davis "Standard Still Life," a Sheeler barn composed of intersecting and overlapping planes, a spare and nervous reclining nude by Max Weber, a shimmering "August Evening" by Burchfield. In sculpture: a compact "Family" by Zorach, a fluid figure "Walking" by Archipenko, a small but expressive sketch by Lipchitz, a graceful Calder mobile, ("Four Black Bottoms") and what for me was the prime revelation of the show, "Lady With House of Cards" by Bernard Reder. This monumental bronze advances like a Victory, holding aloft a platform with its ridiculous yet important structure itself adorned with assorted shapes. On her lips is the smile of a Gothic angel; the play of light and shadow on the flat and curved planes seems endless and endlessly intriguing.

With the point made that there does exist a vigorous tradition of American modern art concerned with man, the show goes on to many of the varied forms that concern takes today.

The range is enormous, the individuality is immense. At one end is the sharp focus painting of deliberately evocative objects by Aaron Bohrod—"Human Comedy" has a coconut, a partly disassembled medical school model of the human head, a dried out seed pod, a single paint brush, and a cheap reproduction of an Ingres nude back. At the other, perhaps, is "Verdant Rise" by Robert Eshoo, which simply translates the spring of the year into paint varied from blue-green to yellow-green and from thin to medium thick.

The nearest thing to a shared manner would be that of the California new realists, Bischoff, Park, McGarrell and Keith Finch. They all use violent contrasts of light and shade for legitimate dramatic effect; the Carravaggesque connection is concealed by the seeming crudity of the paint. These contrasting elements don't cancel each other out so much as unite in impressions of delicacy and force.

There are a number of excellent landscapes, notably those by John Guerin, Martyl, Tseng Yu-Ho and Kachadoorian, all proving in different ways that nature is by no means exhausted as a source. Humor is itself a sign of maturity. Among those who use it are Edgar Ewing, savagely in a pair of militarists, and Sarai Sherman, tenderly in a necking scene.

Humor also touches some sculpture, although, as in the painting, humor is never unmixed. It involves some kind of comment on the subject, on the process which created the piece itself or, at its best, on both at once. Such is the humor in Abbott Pattison's "Giro d'Italia" in which scooter and riders are both reduced to a common set of forms in bronze, and in Fred Farr's "Armored Figure," in which the armor has just about absorbed the figure.

The show is quite possibly the single most important exhibition of contemporary American art in some years. It will be at Urbana through April 5. Get there if you can.

FRANK GETLEIN

A limited number of reprints of Mr. Getlein's two articles "The Same Old Schmeerkunst" and "Schmeerkunst and Politics" are available from The New Republic *for 25 cents.*

MUSIC

An Expressionist Masterpiece

ALBAN BERG'S 40-year old *Wozzeck* has just been added to the repertory of the Metropolitan Opera Company. How long it will stay there is anybody's guess; *Wozzeck* may be a masterpiece of Viennese Expressionism, but Expressionism, at least in music, has a limited appeal. The Metropolitan production is so magnificent in every detail that it may disarm the paying customers, but it will be curious to see how long the City of New York can keep such an unconventional venture on the stage.

The source of the opera is a play called *Woyzeck*, by Georg Buechner, a younger contemporary of Beethoven and Goethe. Though the play was written in 1836, it anticipates the mood of despair that one finds in Austrian music and literature of the age of Kafka. In its own right, *Woyzeck* is something of a modern classic. Excellent translations of it appear in *New Directions XII* and Eric Bentley's *The Modern Drama*.

Berg changed the title to *Wozzeck* and compressed the play from 26 scenes to three acts of five scenes each. Franz Wozzeck emerges as a miserable, dispirited little army orderly whose perpetual lot is to be humiliated, embarrassed, teased, kicked in the behind. With his regular pay and extra money that he earns by submitting to medical experimentation, he supports a slutty mistress, Marie, who is the mother of a little boy. Driven to a homicidal fury by Marie's dalliance with a glamorous drum major, Wozzeck stabs her to death and drowns himself. In all 15 scenes, there are only four overt actions: Marie takes the Drum Major to bed; the Drum Major beats Wozzeck up; Wozzeck kills Marie; Wozzeck drowns. Everything else is oblique. The text is full of ironic and occasionally ambiguous commentary on the action as it unfolds.

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding about the purposes of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Viennese Expressionists and the reason undoubtedly is that the end product of Expressionism is what Schoenberg — the leader of the school — called a "method of composing with twelve tones," commonly known as the 12-tone technique. This method, which in practice is a flexible rule-of-thumb, usually sounds like a mathematical formula when it is discussed in print. It figures here only because Berg's *Wozzeck* was one of the important experimental works which led to the formulation of Schoenberg's theory.

ACTUALLY, expressionism came about from a desire to make music more meaningful than it had been in the past by paying more attention to details than one does in conventional music. In most Western music, the composer conveys his meaning in fairly long units, the shortest of which is the phrase. And in almost any normal phrase of music—in, say, the music of Beethoven—you have a great many notes, either in the main melody or the accompanying parts, which are along just for the ride. The aim of the Expressionists was to condense and compress the compositional process so that there would be a minimum of extraneous notes and such an intense concentration of meaning that one could make a couple of seconds do the work that is normally done in a half-minute of music.

I mention Beethoven, because it is in his work that one finds the seeds from which this idea grew. We're all familiar with the view that, in the late quartets of Beethoven there is a meaning far more profound than that conveyed by the sounds themselves. If one pursues this idea—as the Expressionists did—it is easy to reach the conclusion that profundity of meaning is more important than superficial beauty of sound. Toward this end, the Expressionists did a pretty thorough job of ripping up the tradition they inherited, and of substituting a new vocabulary and new syntax of their own. The result was what is normally known as "atonality."

This is the sort of thing James Joyce was after in literature, and so far as the spectator is concerned, the results are sufficiently similar to draw a parallel. In late Joyce, the meaning is so concentrated that even the intelligent reader has to work hard to find out what it is. In Expressionistic music, the composer's intentions are so concentrated that it takes all the intelligence and good will one can muster to keep up with the flow of ideas. There is, of course, an important difference: You can read a literary work at your own tempo, and reflect as long as you please about any passages that puzzle you, whereas, in a musical work in performance, there is no turning back. If you get lost in a piece by Berg or Schoenberg, you're likely to stay lost for a long time.

Wozzeck is to Berg what Ulysses is to Joyce—a monumental intellectual accomplishment made difficult by oddities of style, but not really forbidding. In both works, there is enough tradition to make a strong tie with the past, but like Joyce, Berg was destined to grow more difficult as his career developed, (though to find a musical *Finnegans Wake* one has to look beyond Berg to the late work of his friend Anton von Webern).

It is 15 years since I first studied the score of *Wozzeck* (at that time there was no other way to get to know it); since then, I've heard excerpts from it, heard it in concert and seen it in performance three times. Each time, I have enjoyed the challenge of the work and the contact with a vital musical imagination that it affords. And each time I've had to ask myself if I liked it. The answer always comes back "No." I am engrossed, fascinated and repelled. At first, I thought that *Wozzeck* must be an all-beautiful work whose beauties were eluding me. After the 1952 performance, I decided that it was essentially a tame, derivative work with sound-effects added for shock. After the Metropolitan performance, I came away feeling that Berg had contrived a deliberate juxtaposition of loveliness with ugliness, of elegance with vulgarity, for theatrical effects that did not always work. I felt, that in the pursuit of meaning Berg sacrificed far too much of the superficial beauty that draws you to music.

Counterpointed against this was a feeling of pride in being in our national opera house on an occasion—the first in at least 31 years—when the Metropolitan introduced a well-rehearsed, well-cast, well-planned, production of an important modern work. For *Wozzeck*, the Metropolitan used every German or Austrian available—anyone who could take a national pride in making a huge success out of *Wozzeck*—to help things along. Karl Boehm was given a huge orchestra in the pit and a small one on stage to conduct, and Berg himself could not have asked for a more sensitive conductor. The sets and costumes were executed not in Metropolitan

EUROPE
We'll see the usual, plus Dublin past the Iron Curtain—Africa to Sweden. A different trip—for the young in spirit who want to be accompanied but not herded around. Also shorter trips. $724-$1390.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Box NR Pasadena, California

RUSSELL KIRK
Author of *The Conservative Mind*
is now editing
MODERN AGE
A Conservative Review
Quarterly—$4.00 the year
"Speaks out forthrightly"—London Times
64 E. Jackson Blvd. Chicago 4

Stark Reason
and other poems
by Emily Dean
50 Cents P O Box 816
Elkhart, Indiana

AUTHORS WANTED BY N. Y. PUBLISHER
New York, N. Y.—One of the nation's largest book publishers is seeking manuscripts of all types—fiction, non-fiction, poetry. Special attention to new writers. If your work is ready for publication, send for booklet RP—*it's free.* Vantage Press, 120 W. 31st St., New York 1. (Midwest Office: 220 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago 4, Ill.)

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING!"
Use your phonograph, recorder.
Fascinating, educational. Catalog, details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association,
Box 24-NR Olympia, Washington

WE MOVE YOU WITHOUT TEARS
Economical, insured household moving. Vans, station wagons. Any time, any place. The Padded Wagon, AL 5-8343 (NYC)

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

FREE! Writer's Market List!
If you're interested in writing fiction or articles for leading magazines, or book publishers, Daniel S. Mead, prominent literary agent, has prepared a catalogue of markets which is a "must" item. For free copy write:
Daniel S. Mead, 915 Broadway, Dept. NR
N. Y. 10, N. Y.

CLASSIFIED RATES
Per word (single insertion) 12c
Per word 6 times in one contract year 11c
Per word 13 times in one contract year 10c
Per word 26 times in one contract year 9c
Per word 52 times in one contract year 8c
NEW REPUBLIC
1244 Nineteenth St. N.W., Wash. 6, D.C.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N. E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

style but in a Central European Expressionist style by Caspar Neher, and Herbert Graf was responsible for the staging, surely the most distinguished work he has done at the Metropolitan.

The work was sung in English, and the diction was easily the best that I have ever heard in an American opera house. The great triumph was for Eleanor Steber—a girl who has lost all of her figure and most of the velvet in her voice—but who, with any luck, may turn *Wozzeck's* Marie into her most memorable role. Since *Wozzeck* is not a competitive exercise in singing, I hesitate to continue in this vein, but two other singers in this production deserve the closest and most respectful attention: Karl Doench (The Captain) and Hermann Uhde. Uhde sang the title role —one of the most difficult tenor parts ever written—with what they call "authority": his voice is rich, flexible and penetrating: his intonation is pure and capable of the most minute variations; his rhythmic control (in this supreme test) is superb; and he can act.

A live performance of this production will be broadcast by CBS Radio on March 14.

ROBERT EVETT

STUDENTS

A reminder that
The New Republic,
long an under-
graduate taste, has
a special student rate—

$5 a year

Gift Subscriptions Solicited

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 - 19th St., N.W.,
Washington 6, D. C.

Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

some spokesmen of the [Catholic] Church want favored treatment, and would ask for it if they had the power." The point of the anti-Kennedy criticism among Catholic editors is not that they want anything approaching a theocracy in this country . . . it is rather that Senator Kennedy moved much farther in the direction of "absolute separation" of Church and State than what people like Will Herberg, Wilber Katz (of the University of Chicago Law School) and others say is necessary or even desirable. The fact is, the US has never known "absolute separation" of Church and State.

Also, Kennedy seems to be saying that the proper place of religion is in the pigeon hole of "private life." Catholics are not the only ones in this country who are denying that you can divorce religion and moral principles from your life as a politician, professor, editor or whatever.

Finally, Catholic editors are dismayed because Senator Kennedy apparently feels it is necessary to "explain" or to answer questions on Church-State relations, questions addressed only to prospective Catholic nominees for the Presidency. We think it is an insult to single out Catholics as suspect in this matter.

Gerald Johnson in the same issue raises the question of whether the Catholic Church reserves "the right to put pressure on (Senator Kennedy) to alter his announced political policy" in the direction, I suppose, of Church-State union. Now I, of course, cannot speak for the Church any more than can Senator Kennedy. But what I would like to suggest is that American Catholics think so little about the possibility of such "pressure" that to see it seriously advanced as a disqualifying mark against a political candidate seems to be the limit of ridiculousness.

I am writing this letter, not to boost the ambitions of Senator Kennedy (as a matter of fact, there are three or four Democrats I would rank ahead of him in terms of courage and ability). I simply wanted to let you know that (1) it came as something of a surprise to read such foreboding about Catholic candidates in as literate and mature a publication as *The New Republic* and (2) that Catholic criticism of Kennedy does not mean American Catholics are unhappy over the present relationship of Church and State in this country or would change that relationship even if they had the requisite "power."

DONALD MCDONALD, *Editor*
The Catholic Messenger
Davenport, Iowa

► *Farming Isn't What It Was*

SIRS:

HELEN HILL MILLER'S article on "Farming Isn't What It Was" was good. But may I point out one error. It says: "Consider the startling fact that if all the farmers who raise wheat and all the farmers who raise corn did not plant one single grain this year, supplies of both would be entirely adequate for next year." This is true of wheat, not true of corn. The carry-over last fall was 1.5 billion bushels. Annual consumption is around 3 billion bushels. Even if you take the extra wheat and feed it, there would still be a feed shortage. We actually have in corn about a six months' reserve. Wheat, of course, is another matter.

DONALD R. MURPHY, *Director*
Editorial Research, Wallaces' Farmer
Des Moines, Iowa

► *US and French Encyclopedists*

SIRS:

DONALD COOK'S article in *The New Republic* of March 2 on the biography of Ruth Benedict, written by her friend Margaret Mead, referred to the *Encyclopedia of Social Science*. Correctly, in my estimation, Cook compared the writing and compilation of that magnificent encyclopedia to the achievement of the great French Encyclopedists. May I respectfully remind scholars everywhere that the monumental American work owes its existence, in part, to the skilled executive and scholarly hand of Doctor Alvin Johnson, elder statesman of American social science. What a tribute it would be to octogenarian Doctor Johnson to have the masterful *Encyclopedia of Social Science* revised, in print, and available to students around the world. Where among the many millions in our funds and trusts are there just two or three million for the scholarly revision of the *Encyclopedia?*

ELLIS W. ROBERTS
Wilkes-Barre, Pa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED